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In 1958, and again in 1959, President Eisenhower recommended
legislation which would have empowered the Secretary of Labor to
remove a union's tax exemption as a sanction against labor misconduct.
This proposal, although not embodied in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,' served to focus attention, however briefly,
on an aspect of labor unions rarely exposed to public scrutiny. The
recent outpouring of legal commentary on labor activities has centered
almost exclusively on the problems inherent in defining and proscribing
unfair labor practices,2 and in uncovering and combatting union corruption.3 Virtually ignored by the legal writers has been the tax status
of unions.4 An understanding of this status, however, is essential to
tA:B. 1958, Princeton University; LL.B. 1961, Yale University. Member, New
York Bar.
t A.B. 1958, Williams College; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University. Member, New
York and Ohio Bars.
173 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-531 (Supp. 1961).
2 See, e.g., Schwartz, The Penumbra of State Regulation of Unfair Labor Practices, 38 B.U.L. REv. 553 (1958); Comment, 11 STAN. L. Rr-v. 565 (1959); 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 876 (1959).

3 See, e.g., Englander, What's So Odd About Honesty?, 10 LAB. L.J. 188 (1959);
Shade, The Problem of Union Corruption and the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, 38 TEXAS L. REv. 468 (1960); Wayman, Management's
Share in Labor Scandals, 26 TENN. L. REv. 364 (1959).
4 Only one brief review of the labor exemption, containing no discussion of its
policy, can be found. See Note, Open Season on Tax Loopholes-Should Section
101 Be Modified?, 38 GEO. L.J. 620 (1950). Congress has also ignored the exemption.
Typical is the statement by Representative Mills, who as Chairman of the House
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an evaluation of the labor union as an economic entity and particularly
as a participant in the collective bargaining process. This Article will,
therefore, attempt to describe the current tax position of labor unions,
and to appraise the relationship between the Code's treatment of unions
and labor's role in modern society. The potential dangers inherent in
that relationship will also be discussed.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR'S TAX STATUS

A. History of Section 501(c) (5)
A provision exempting labor unions has appeared in every income
tax statute enacted since the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, 5 and
now appears as sectiofi 501(c) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Yet during its entire history, only one reported statement of its
policy by a member of Congress can be found.'
The special treatment accorded unions did not originate in an
income tax statute, but in an excise tax. The first income tax,7 enacted in 1894 and declared unconstitutional in 1895,8 did not specifically
refer to unions, though it did provide:
That nothing herein contained shall apply to . . . associa-

tions organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious,
or educational purposes, including fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations operated upon the lodge system
and providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, and other
benefits to the members of such societies.9
The excise tax of 1909, however, which placed a tax of one per
cent on the net income exceeding $5000 of certain forms of profitmaking
enterprises," ° specifically provided that "nothing in this section .
Ways and Means Committee is the one Congressman most responsible for tax legislation: "Very frankly, I must admit that I have devoted a lot less time and thought
to the area of tax-exempt organizations than to almost any other area of the [tax]
law." Panel Discussion on Tax Revision Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1100 (1959).
5 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 11(6) (a), 38 Stat. 172; Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463, § 11(a) (1), 39 Stat. 766; Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §231(1), 40 Stat. 1076;
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §231(1), 42 Stat. 253; Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234,
§231(1), 43 Stat. 282; Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 231(1), 44 Stat. 39; Revenue
Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 103(1), 45 Stat. 812; Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 103(1),
47 Stat. 193; Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 101 (1), 48 Stat. 700; Revenue Act of
1936, ch. 690, § 101(1), 49 Stat. 1673; Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 101(1), 52
Stat. 480; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, subch. 1, § 101(1), 53 Stat. 33.
6 See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
7 Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-33, 28 Stat. 553-57.
8 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
9 Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556.
10 Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 112. This tax was upheld in Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
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shall apply to labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, or to
fraternal beneficiary societies . .
,
Because the tax was tacked
onto the bitterly contested Payne-Aldrich Tariff, it received little congressional or public attention, and the exemption received even less
consideration. The only reference to the section in the legislative history was in response to a question about fraternal beneficiary societies.
The Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee included labor unions
in his response that "the committee is of opinion that they are not included within the provisions of this bill, and it does not intend to have
them included." 12
This excise tax exemption was incorporated in the first income tax
statute passed after the ratification of the sixteenth amendment, 18 apparently with little if any critical deliberation. The legislative history was
again uninformative and the only recorded statement of congressional
policy is a later remark by Senator McCumber:
Take a labor union, for instance. While it is organized to
secure better wages for laborers and better conditions it does
not do business at a profit; it is not organized for profit at all,
except in a general way for the benefits to be derived from it
and like organizations , . . . [G]enerally when we speak
of a labor organization . . . we do not have in mind those
organizations which are doing business for profit, 4
B. The Scope of the Exemption
The scope of the exemption provided by section 501 (c) (5) is not
expressly limited. The statutory term "labor organizations" is nowhere
defined, but this apparently unconditional grant of immunity has been
administratively qualified and judicially restricted,
In 1920, the Treasury considered the tax status of a business enterprise owned and controlled by a union but not a part of it as such,
The sole purpose of the business was to provide employment for union
members; all profits were remitted to the union treasury. 5 The exemption was denied on the ground that the activity of the enterprise did not
differ significantly from an ordinary business venture.'
Four years
later, however, the Treasury allowed an exemption to a corporation
1

Act of Aug, 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113. (Emphasis added.)
(remarks of Senator Flint).
13 Tariff Act of 1913, ch, 16, § 11(G) (a), 38 Stat. 172.
1461 CONG. REC. 5958 (1921). Subsequent discussion turned to unions which
might operate stores or banks, with some Senators stating that unions should be
taxable on profits from those activities. This suggestion was not implemented until
1950. See note 41 infra and accompanying text
15 2 Cum. BuLL. 211 (1920).
10 !Nd,
1244 CONG. Rc, 3937 (1909)
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which had been formed by several labor organizations for the purpose
of publishing a newspaper." The paper, which accepted no advertising,
was designed to publicize the activities of the member organizations and
to print items of interest to labor. Evidently the corporation was not
intended to be operated at a profit, since the costs of publication were
met exactly by contributions of the stockholders. The Treasury based
its decision on the theory that "what each of the labor organizations
may do individually they may do collectively, and that a corporation
organized and operated for the sole purpose of publishing a paper under
the circumstances of the instant case is entitled to exemption as a labor
organization .

.

.

."

In 1926, the Board of Tax Appeals denied an exemption to a nonfraternal, mutual assessment, life and health insurance association.
Though the organization had no capital stock outstanding and was not
organized for profit,' 9 the Board noted that "the express purpose [of
the association was] to carry on the business of health and casualty insurance." 20 Although composed almost entirely of laborers and domestic servants, its membership was not so limited by its constitution;
therefore the Board refused to treat the association as a labor organization. 2 '
In 1939, the Board relied on its earlier newspaper ruling 2 2 to
grant an exemption to a corporation which owned and operated an
office building.2" All the stock was owned by labor unions. Rates were
set to equal expenses, but a small profit was earned. The building contained offices, all of which were leased by labor unions; a recreation
hall, the use of which was restricted to members of the stockholder labor
unions; and an auditorium and meeting halls, which were occasionally
used by members of the public. The Board assumed without discussion
thaf each participating union could have owned and operated the building and its facilities individually without losing its exemption, and then
concluded that what each union could do alone it could do in cooperation with others through a corporate agency. A broad interpretation
of "labor organization" was expounded:
The term has been used continuously for 30 years to bestow
tax exemption, and it never has been found desirable by Congress to qualify it or by the administrator to give it a narrowing interpretation .

.

.

. It bespeaks a liberal construction

17 S.M. 2558, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 207-08 (1924).
18 Ibid.

19 Workingmen's Co-op. Ass'n of the United Ins. League, 3 B.T.A. 1352 (1926).
(Emphasis added.)
20 Id. at 1354.
21 Ibid.
22 See note
23Portland

17 supra and accompanying text.
Co-op. Labor Temple Ass'n v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 450'(1939).
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to embrace the common acceptation of the term, including
labor unions and councils and the groups which are ordinarily
organized to protect and promote the interests of labor,24
Treasury Department Regulations interpreting the exemption provisions have continued essentially unchanged since 1929, The current
Regulatiois, promulgated in 1958, read in part:
The organizations contemplated by section 501 (c) (5) as entitled to exemption from income taxation are those which:
(1) Have no net earnings inuring to the benefit of any membet, atd
(2) Have as their objects the betterment of the conditions of
those engaged in such pursuits, the improvement of the grade
of their products; and the development of a higher degree of
efficiency in their respective occupations.
The 1958 Regulation departed from previous versions only in eliminating a requirement that section 501(c) (5) organizations be "educatiohal or Instructive in character," 2
In 1959, the Treasury was asked to apply this regulation to a
"committee [of employer and employee representatives] organized for
the purpose of supervisinig the enforcement of apprenticeship standards
in various skilled crafts.
," 27 The non-profit committee was supported primarily by contributions from employers and a union. The
Treasury, relying on the object of the committee-to improve the lot of
apprentices-ruled that it was exempt. This holding is consistent with
the regulation insofar as it requires that the organization's object be
the betterment of labor conditions. But the decision runs counter to the
general rule of tax statute construction that in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, Congress is presumed to have adopted the natural, ordinary, and familiar meaing of a term. The Treasury conceded that
the term "labor organization" usually denotes a union solely of employees. In this instance, however, it felt that
the inclusion of such a committee inr
the tern is warranted
because of the fulfillment by the committee of the tests established for labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations
and the further fact that the committee is similar in character
to many of the organizations exempted from income taxation
as agricultural or horticultural organizations under section
,501 (c) (S5) of 'the Code.2"
24 Id. at 455.
25

Treas. Reg § 1.501(c)(5)-(a) (1958).
8
P
2 7 Compare Treas. Reg. §,39.101(1)-1 (1939).
Rev. Rul. 59-6, 1959-1 Cuia. Buut. 121, 122.
29 Id. at 123.
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In 1958, the Treasury had ruled that a union lost its exemption if
it made death, sickness, or accident payments to individual members
out of funds contributed by the general membership.29 Because it believed that as a general rule the objectives of a labor organization must
be the betterment of its membership as a group, the Treasury objected
to the large element of personal benefit in such a plan."° This ruling
was very recently overruled. The new ruling provides that if the plan
"has as its object the betterment of the conditions of the members" the
presence of individual benefit does not preclude exemption under
501 (c) (5).31

Another aspect of the 1958 ruling, however, was not explicitly
overruled. In dictum, the Treasury had indicated that it would have
been proper for the labor organization to provide sickness, death, and
similar benefits to its members as individuals, if the payments had not
amounted to a substantial economic benefit to the members, and the
fund used to provide them had been sufficiently small to warrant a
finding that this activity was only an incidental function of the organization."2 This statement can be characterized as a "major purpose"
test. An otherwise exempt labor organization can conduct an activity
which has no relation to the customary activities of a labor organization without losing its exemption, provided the activity is not a major
purpose of the organization. This represents a major departure from
earlier rulings and cases. Previously, the practice in conducting
marginal activities had been to organize a distinct legal entity under
the aegis of the tax-exempt labor organization. In that context, the
Treasury or the courts were able to rule on the treatment of the questioned activity as such, without questioning the parent's tax status;
if any activity was found to be without the scope of section 501 (c) (5),
the exemption was denied only to the satellite entity. Under the 1958
ruling, however, the parent itself can conduct such an activity, and,
provided the activity is not major, retain its tax exemption, perhaps
even as to the activity in question.'
Arguably all of the foregoing administrative and judicial interpretations of section 501 (c) (5) and its predecessors can be read back into
the Code on the theory that Regulations and interpretations long
continued without substantive change applied to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes are deemed to have received congressional
29

Rev. Rul. 58-143, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 239, overruled in part, Rev. Rul. 62-17,

1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 8, at 8.
30 1958-1 CUM. BULL. at 240.
31 Rev. Rul. 62-17, 1962 INT. REv. BULL. No. 8, at 9.
32

Rev. Rul. 58-143, 1958-1 Cum. BULi 239, 240.
83 Ibid.
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approval and to have the force of law.3 4 However, this canon of construction erroneously assumes that Congress in enacting the Codea maze of conflicting policies 3 5-- was familiar with the Regulations,
administrative rulings, and court decisions which construed and applied earlier tax statutes. 8 It would be an even greater step from
reality to apply that presumption to a section such as 501 (c) (5) which
has been virtually ignored by Congress.
C. Unrelated Business Income
Section 5 01 (c) (5) exempts on an all-or-nothing basis. If all of
a union's activities are within its scope, the provision, of course, encompasses them. But when a labor organization conducts an incidental
nonexempt activity, the possibility arises that an otherwise taxable
enterprise will become tax exempt by association. This tax shelter
might give a union's nonexempt activity a competitive advantage over
similar activities conducted by nonexempt organizations. 7
Allegations of such competitive advantage were disregarded by
the courts which held that feeder organizations--otherwise nonexempt
business enterprises whose entire profits went to tax-exempt organizations-were themselves exempt. The most well-known example of the
tax-exempt feeder was the C. F. Mueller Company, a major macaroni
manufacturer. Its certificate of incorporation provided that it "is
organized exclusively for charitable, scientific, literary, and/or educationa, purposes and no part of its income or property shall inure to the
private benefit of any stockholder, director, or officer, or any individual
or corporation other than New York University for the exclusive benefit of its school of Law." 3 All net income of the company was, in fact,
paid to the University. The Tax Court, however, held that a competitive, commercial enterprise was not tax exempt simply because it
was operated for the exclusive benefit of an organization that was. The
Tax Court emphasized the adverse competitive effect of exempting a
feeder organization. "[It] could have a vicious effect upon nonexempt competitors because the exempt organization, unlike the mere
holding company, might be able to undersell its competitors as a result
34 See Keystone Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 402, 405 (3d Cir. 1950) ;
BITTKER, FEDERAL INcOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 28 (2d ed. 1961). See generally .6MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 34.19 (rev. ed. 1957).
35 See generally 1 MERTENS, op. cit. spra note 34, § 3.01.
36 But see McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102 (1935).

7
3 A tax free status gives two competitive advantages-ability to charge lower
prices and ability to devote funds to reinvestment without first satisfying tax obligations.
38 C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 922 (1950), reV'd, 190 F.2d 120
(3d Cir. 1951).
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of the tax advantage and thus either drive them out of business or
absorb them through its unlimited power to expand." " The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, reversed on the ground that
the purpose of the company, regardless of the nature of its activity,
was solely to benefit a tax-exempt organization.40
The tax shelter possibilities of both the feeder subsidiary and the
operating division were severely restricted when Congress in 1950,
largely responding to the public furor over the Mueller case, enacted
essentially what are now sections 502 and 511-14 of the Code. 41 Section 502 denies exemption to most feeder organizations. Sections 51114 deal with unrelated business income of exempt organizations.
Section 511 imposes the normal corporate tax and surtax upon
the unrelated business income" of exempt organizations. An unrelated
trade or business is defined as one regularly carried on by an exempt
organization, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the
purposes for which the exemption is granted. 4' A trade or business in
which "substantially all the work . . . is performed for the organiza-

tion without compensation" is, however, expressly excluded from the
47 and capital gains 48
48
definition. 44 Dividends, 45 interest, royalties,
are similarly excepted. Rental income generally is not unrelated business taxable income, except for mortgaged property owned by an exempt organization and subject to a lease of five years or more. 49 Only
that portion of rental income, however, which corresponds to the ratio
of indebtedness on the building to the adjusted basis of the property is
taxable.5" Further, income from leases entered into primarily for purposes substantially related to the basic functions of an exempt organiza39 Id.at 930.
Problems involving feeders have arisen in other
contexts as well. In Villyard v. Regents of University System of Georgia, 204 Ga.
517, 50 S.E.2d 313 (1948), a local laundry, alleging unfair competition, sought but
failed to enjoin a university-operated laundry from accepting business from families
of those connected with the school. Several cases have questioned whether exempt
organizations could, under their charters and state law, conduct certain unrelated
activities. See Attorney General ex rel. Sheehan v. Board of Educ., 175 Mich. 438,
141 N.W. 574 (1913); State v. Southern Junior College, 166 Tenn. 535, 64 S.W2d 9
(1933) ; Cook v. Chamberlain, 199 Wisc. 42, 255 N.W. 141 (1929).
41 Revenue Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 948 (now INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 502, 511-14).
42 INT. Rav. CODE oF 1954, § 512.
43 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 513(a).
44
INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 513(a) (1).
4
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b) (1).
46 Ibid.
4
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b) (2).
4
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b) (5).
49 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 514.
50 I-T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 514(c) (1).
40 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
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tion is not included even if the lease is for a period greater than five
years and the building is mortgaged."'
Revenue Ruling 59-330 is the only reported application of the 1950
amendments to a labor organizationr 2 To meet maintenance expenses,
a labor organization had conducted semi-weekly bingo games open to
the general public. The Treasury ruled that the income therefrom was
taxable under section 511 as unrelated business income. It held that
the semi-weekly character of the games qualified them as regularly
carried on, and that their sole function-the accrual of income to defray
expenses-was not substantially related to the purpose of the union.
The application of the 1950 amendments to labor unions can perhaps best be illustrated by considering a hypothetical situation. Assume
that a truck drivers' union operates a school to teach driver safety procedures. If substantially all of the instruction is conducted by union
members without compensation, the school's profits are not taxable by
reason of section 513(a) (1). Even if the labor organization hires
and compensates professional instructors to operate the school, but restricts enrollment to union members, the profits thereof will be nontaxable because safety instruction aims to better drivers' Working conditions, improve the quality of their product, and develop in them a
higher degree of efficiency." But if the school is open to members of
the public, that part of the income derived from nonmember payments
will be taxable as unrelated trade or business taxable income, because
the sole relation of nonmember instruction to the union would be the
accrual of income. Similar results would ensue if the school were
operated as a feeder subsidiary rather than as an integral part of the
union.5 4 The Regulations to section 502, however, produce an anomalous result in one situation. If the school is owned jointly by several
drivers' unions, its income is taxable, even though the instruction is
given only to members of the parent labor unions. 5 This regulation
is apparently based on the theory that since the income of a school operated by one union would be taxable if traceable to fees paid by members of another, a joint enterprise should be similarly treated. It
should also be noted that the provisions in section 5 13(a) (1) which
exempt a business in which substantially all of the work is done without
compensation, do not apply to feeder subsidiaries.5 6
The same is true if the building
51 NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 514(b) (3) (A) (i
is occupied by the organization. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 514(b) (3) (A) (ii).
52 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 153.
53 See Treas. Reg. § 1-501(c) (5) (a) (2) (1958).
54 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 502.
55
Treas. Reg. § 1.502(b) (1950); accord, S.M. 2558, 111-2 Cum. BuLL. 207

.

(1924).
56 INT.

R-v.

apply to § 502.

CODE OF

1954, §513(a)(1), which creates this exception, does not

146

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[VoI.111:137

Although these provisions have probably eliminated the more obvious means of exploiting tax-exempt status, 57 the present statutory
scheme still grants immunity to potentially major sources of union in58
come. First, $1000 of unrelated business taxable income is deductible.
Second, the requirement that an unrelated trade or business be carried
on regularly 59 leaves open the possibility that an exempt organization
can conduct an occasional unrelated activity at no tax cost. An occasional bingo game or raffle, which might yield great profits, would bear
no tax since it would be considered nonregular. Third, the fact that income, however large, from activities performed gratuitously by members of a labor organization is not taxable 60 provides an obvious way to
evade the unrelated trade or business tax. Finally, the most significant
exemption of income is the provision excepting dividends, interest,
rents, royalties, and capital gains received from the operation of an
61
unrelated trade or business.
D. Related Statutory Provisions
Employee benefit plans 62 constitute a type of labor organization
which conceivably could qualify under section 501 (c) (5) for taxexempt status but for the applicability of other subsections. Ordinarily,
these "welfare plans" are operated entirely apart from the labor unions
with which they are affiliated. Among the benefits they provide are
pensions, health insurance, and supplemental unemployment payments.
Virtually all of these are negotiated by collective bargaining either on
a company or industry-wide basis. The plans are generally financed by
contributions from the employer in lieu of wages,63 although employees
occasionally contribute directly. Some unions operate their own funds
from members' dues or special assessments. Most are administered by
57 Substantial problems remain in interpreting and applying these provisions, parSee Note, 34 NOTRE DAME LAw. 238
(1959); 60 YALE L.J. 851, 854 (1951).
8
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b) (12).
59
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 512(a).
60 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 513(a) (1).
61 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 512(b). Several congressional committees characterized such income as "passive." Congress appears to have felt that such income
was insubstantial and derived from such sources as to have no detrimental effects on
the investment market. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1950).
62
These funds have mushroomed in the last 15 years to the point where their
total resources stagger the imagination. Best estimates are that the combined assets
of pension and welfare funds of all unions approximate $50,000,000,000 at the present
time, with contributions exceeding payments at the rate of 4 to 5 billion dollars
annually. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 10, cols. 1-2; id., Feb. 25, 1961, p. 6,
col. 1; Levitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 827, 828
(1958). This amounts to approximately twice the total assets of this country's
largest corporate enterprise. See 1961 AMRICAN TEL. & TEL. Co. AxN. REP. 26.
63These fringe benefits cost American business $18,000,000,000 in 1960, 7.4%
of total labor costs. See N.Y.Times, Jan. 9, 1961, p. 61, col. 1.

ticularly in delimiting "related" activities.
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independent trustees selected by management, but some also have union
representatives."
The Code treats employee benefit plans in three general categories.
The first consists of pension plans, which are further subdivided into
trust funds, 5 organized in legal form, and insurance plans 6 6-- life insurance policies taken by the employer to cover his employees. The tax
results are similar.6 7 If a pension trust does not discriminate in favor
of executives or highly compensated employees and cannot be used for
any purpose other than employee compensation, it qualifies under section 401 for exemption of its investment income pursuant to section
501 (a). In one case, a section 401 pension trust was taxed on rental
income from railroad tank cars which it had purchased and leased even
though the trustee's only duty was to receive the money, while the lessee handled maintenance and operation. .The Treasury ruled that this
was a regularly carried-on business having no relation to the purpose
of the trust other than as a source of revenue.6" Pension trusts can also
lose their entire exemption if they engage in specified prohibited transactions which substantially divert income or corpus to the trust creator,
a substantial contributor thereto, or an affiliate thereof.6" If the trust
fund organizes a feeder organization, the entire proceeds of which go to
the trust, or if the trust itself engages in an unrelated business activity,
70
the resulting income is subject to tax.
The second category of welfare plans consists of voluntary employers' associations which provide sickness, accident, hospital, and
similar benefits. They are tax exempt pursuant to section 501 (c) (9),
provided that no part of the association's net earnings other than benefit payments inures to the benefit of any individual, and that at least
85 % of the association's net income is contributed by employers and
employees. These associations are subject to the feeder organization
6 One observer has stated that labor is pressing for a more active role in the
conduct of funds now under employer command. This will mean more union money
invested in housing for low and middle income families, community facilities, and
corporate securities. This latter development raises the problem that unions may
someday obtain a dominant role in the ownership of many large companies, thus
occupying both sides of a collective bargaining table. See Raskin, The Unions and
Their Wealth, The Atlantic, April 1962, pp. 87-88.
06 INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §§ 401-04.
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 804-05.
67 Capital gains, accumulated in reserves by life insurance companies for qualified

pension and profit sharing plans, are fully tax exempt. Basically, all income of life
insurance companies is divided into two parts-the policyholder's share, which is
exempt; and the company's share, which is taxable. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 804.
Pension Plan Reserves, as defined by INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 805 (a) (2) and Treas.
Reg. 1.805-7 (1960), are included in the policyholder's portion, and amounts credited
to them in the company's current earnings are exempt from tax. Life Insurance
Company Income Tax Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 112, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 801-20 (Supp. 1961).
,as Rev. Rul. 60-206, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 201.
19 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 503 (c).
70
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 502, 511.
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rule, but not to the unrelated business income provision.. While the
prohibited transaction restriction applied to pension trusts does not
pertain to section 501 (c) (9) associations, 7 1 the stringent requirements
for qualification under that section eliminate the need for these
limitations.
To avoid the requirement that 85% of the income of a 501 (c) (9)
association derive from employer-employee contributions, a third type
of plan came into use. Supplemental unemployment benefit plans, although not new, were not utilized on a broad scale until 1955 when the
United Auto Workers included such a plan in its contract with the
auto manufacturers. These plans, designed to add to state unemployment compensation payments by providing 60% of straight-time take
home pay,72 were originally granted exemption under section 501
(c) (9) by analogy to liealth and accident plans.73 Similar plans were
However, difficulty arose
subsequently adopted in other industries.'
when many plans found that their revenue from investment and other
sources exceeded 15% of their total income. At that point, Congress
enacted section 501 (c) (17), explicitly exempting trusts designed to
provide supplemental unemployment compensation, regardless of the
source of their income, so long as they meet the tests of nondiscrimination applied to pension trusts. 5
II. THE, MODERN LABOR

UNION AS A SECTION

501(c) (5)

LABOR ORGANIZATION

Labor's tax exemption originated without congressional deliberation; it continues to exist without reexamination despite vast changes
in the labor movement which at least pose the question of whether
favored treatment is still warranted. The regulations which define
qualifying agricultural, labor, and horticultural organizations hardly
take cognizance of these changes. The narrow list of legitimate objectives of such organizations, if construed as setting the outer limits of
permissible activity, might well exclude most modem labor unions."
The exemption appears to have survived only by virtue of the acquiescence by Congress and the Treasury Department in the new content
'77
which changing times have given to the term "labor organization.
INT. RFv. CODE OF 1954, § 503(a) (2).
See Rev. Rul. 56-102, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 90. Special provisions are made for
the rare
cases which do not qualify for state aid.
73
Rev. Rul. 58-442, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 194.
74 See Rev. Rul. 57-37, 1957-1 Cum.BULL. 18.
75 Congress felt that these funds were non-profit in character, provided worthwhile benefits, and did not compete with profit making enterprises. H.R. REP. No.
1145, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959).
76 See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
77 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
71
72
'
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This theory of implied congressional approval can, however, be
buttressed by an argument based on statutory construction. The modem labor union may be entitled to tax-exempt status as a "labor organization" because it possesses the principal attributes of other organizations granted exemptions under section 501 (c). While this section
was neither conceived nor adopted as a unified whole, since each of its
seventeen subsections and thirty-five classifications has its own legislative history and policy 7 a general pattern is nonetheless discernible.
First, all tax-exempt *organizations are non-profit. This fundamental prerequisite has received little critical examination by the courts
or commentators and is usually taken for granted. It is explicitly provided for some organizations in the Code or the Regulations by the
phrase "not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder." " As to the
other exempt groups, it is implicit. This does not mean, however, that
a non-profit organization's revenue may never exceed its disbursements.
But if the organization does have an excess of revenue over expenditures it may not distribute it to members as dividends or similar payments; all income must be used to provide the benefits for which the
exemption is granted. Labor unions qualify under this standard."0
Second, exempt organizations formed primarily to advance a
group interest may not provide more than minimal benefits to nonmembers. 8 ' Thus a social club which opened its doors to the public
lost its exemption.'
Except insofar as nonunion employees benefit
from union negotiated contracts, labor unions rarely provide direct
services to nonmembers and would, therefore, appear to comply with
this limitation.
Third, exempt organizations can be classified into two general
categories on the basis of the benefits they render. One group consists
7
8 See generally Sugarman & Pomeroy, Buiness Income of Exempt Organizatiorw, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 424 (1960).
79 See, e.g., IxT. REv. CoDa oF 1954, §§ 501(c) (6) - (7).
80
See West Laurel Hill Cemetery Co. v. Rothensies, 139 F.2d 50, 56 (3d Cir.
1943).
8
1 Dealings with the public must be only incidental or the cooperative and nonprofit features would be destroyed. In theory, these organizations collect funds only
from members and later distribute other funds, products, or services of an equal
value back to the contributors, presumably at cost. No profit is made. Furthermore,
a non-profit organization may not derive "profits from outside sources wholly disproportionate to its nontaxable purposes, and [if] such profits inure to the benefit
of its members in the nature of permanent improvements and facilities, it loses its

exempt status ...

1947).

"

Aviation Club v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 984, 986 (10th Cir.

82
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (7)-1 (1958).
Tax Ct. Mem. 1731 (1942).

See also Town & Country Club, 11 P-H
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of those organizations which primarily benefit the general public, while
the other contains those which benefit their own members.
The first group, which may be termed "public welfare' organizations, is covered by only two of section 5 01 (c)'s seventeen subsections;
but it encompasses the largest and best known of exempt organizations.
Included in this category are non-profit corporations, community
chests, funds or foundations which are operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, public safety, literary or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children and animals,' civic
leagues operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, and
local employee associations devoted wholly to charitable or educational
purposes.84
The second set of organizations, those which primarily benefit
their own members or contributors, can be further subdivided into
member job-oriented organizations, which enhance the individual's economic position, and member welfare-oriented organizations which promote personal well being. Groups of persons with a common business
interest organized essentially to increase individual earning capacity
include agricultural and horticultural organizations,85 business leagues,
chambers of commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade,8" mutual
ditch, irrigation, telephone, and insurance companies," credit unions.ss
limited purpose non-stock financial institutions providing reserves for
liability, and banking associations whose profits are shared by their
members.89 Organizations devoted largely to the personal welfare of
their members include employee associations9 " and fraternal lodges
which provide sickness, accident, and health benefits; 11 supplemental
unemployment trusts, 2 clubs 9" and local employee or community associations 9 4 devoted to recreation, pleasure, or other non-profitable pur83 INT. REv. CODE OF
8-INTr REV. CODE. oF

§ 501(c) (16).
85

1954, § 501 (c) (3).
1954, §§501(c)(4)-(5).

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, § 501 (c) (5).

See also INT. REv. CODE

See also INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

§ 501 (c) (16)X
88
87

1954, § 501(c) (6).
OF 1954, § 501(c) (14).

INT. RFv. CODE OF
INT. REv. CODE

88 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
o INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(c) (9)-(10).

1954, § 501 (c) (8).
or 1954, § 501(c) (17).
OF 1954, § 501(c) (7).
OF 1954, § 501(c) (4).

91 INT. REv. CODE OF
92

INT. I EV. CODE

)3 INT.
9INT.

REv. CODE
REv. CODE

oF 1954,
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poses, local teachers' retirement funds, 5 mutual cemetery companies,96
and local benevolent life insurance companies.y7
Judged by the nature of the benefits they provide, labor unions
again qualify for tax exemption. Today's unions engage in public welfare programs, are member job-oriented, and provide for the individual
well being of their members.
The most significant benefits provided by the modern labor union
are job related. As the agent for collective bargaining, the union negotiates with the employer concerning wages and general working conditions, represents its members in grievance proceedings, and enforces
discipline." In addition, it maintains strike benefit funds, 99 sponsors
vocational classes,"° publishes labor newspapers, builds and operates
labor buildings for meetings and social and recreational purposes, and
conducts public relaiions and advertising campaigns.101 In general
these are the traditional benefits of the labor union, and those which
probably prompted the original tax exemption in 1909.
In recent times unions have come to devote more time, effort, and
money to promoting the personal welfare of their members as well.
This concern is most obvious in three areas-health, housing, and retirement. Unions are making increased efforts to safeguard the health
of their members and their families. They are also concerned with offsetting the high cost of medical services. Some unions are setting up
cooperative health plans, 0 2 health insurance funds, 0 3 prepaid drug preThe high
scription plans,'0 4 health resorts, hospitals, 0 5 and clinics.'
1954, §501 (c) (11).
1954, § 501 (c)(13).
1954, §501(c) (12).
11A noted commentator has stated that the greatest union benefits have been in
25 IxT. REv. CODE OF

SINT.

REv. CODE OF
MINT. REv. CODE OF

the realm of "nonpecuniary concessions" such as protecting the employee from arbitrary or discriminatory action by employers by use of grievance procedures, seniority
requirements, racial bans, etc. Their actual economic benefits have been modest.
Chamberlain, The Corporationand the Trade Union, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN

Socm'rY 133 (Mason ed. 1960).

99
For some unions, strike benefits can be a major expenditure. In 1959 alone,
the United Auto Workers paid its members $12,600,000 for this purpose. An additional $6,000,000 was paid during their brief walkout against the Big Three during
1961. In 1959, strikes cost the steel workers $6,300,000, the machinists $4,400,000,

and the Teamsters $1,100,000. Business Week, June 4, 1960, pp. 83-84. These funds
for the strikers; they create a powerful psychological
not only provide subsistence bargaining.

for use in collective
weapon
10 0 See Business Week, June 4, 1960, pp. 83-84. The United Steel Workers
recently announced that it will provide adult education classes to combat hard core
unemployment, with government assistance under the Manpower Development &
Retraining Act of 1962. Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1962, p. 2, cols. 3-4.
101 See Raskin, The Unions and Their Wealth, The Atlantic, April 1962, pp. 94-95.
02
1 See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1961, p. 37, col. 8.
103 See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1961, p. 132, col. 3.
104 See N.Y. Times, July 7, 1961, p. 27, col. 1.
105 See N.Y. Times, April 16, 1961, p. 44, col. 1.
106 See N.Y. Times, June 3, 1961, p. 46, cols. 6-7.
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cost of housing has prompted unions to invest an increasingly higher
percentage of their treasuries and related pension and welfare plan
funds in housing developments.107 Unions are also broadening the coverage of their pension and welfare programs, and some have built or
constructed hotels for their retired members.' 0 8 Other non-joboriented benefits include scholarship programs for members' children,
free legal advice, civil rights projects," 9 citizenship courses, consumer
cooperatives, and recreational and social activities.
A small but expanding part of the benefits provided by labor unions
also accrue to the community as a whole. Labor organizations sponsor world wide propaganda activities stressing the benefits of free
labor,"' donate large sums of money and services to various charities,"' bring foreign workers here for job training,"2 contribute funds
to promote unionization abroad,"' and provide jobs for foreign students
on vacation." 4 They have recruited men to help build the Distant
Early Warning radar line in Canada and projects for the Peace
Corps,"' and have solicited "no strike" pledges from men working on
missile sites.
The range of activities undertaken by modem labor unions thus
provides an even stronger basis for their inclusion as a tax-exempt organization than existed in 1909 when unions were largely preoccupied
with job oriented benefits." 8 If the union tax exemption is to be re107

See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1961, p. 18, col. 2.

10 8 Ten unions have joined together to purchase a two hundred and five room

ocean front hotel in the heart of Miami Beach to be operated as a non-profit, residential hotel for retired members. The group plans to buy four more hotels in other
cities. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1961, § 10, p. 3, cols. 1-5.
109 In 1959, the United Auto Workers devoted $126,195 to achieving fair practices and eliminating discrimination. U.S. News & World Report, April 25, 1960, p. 47.
110 See LaNEm, AmERICA AS A CIVlLIzATIoN 327 (1957).
11 The AFL-CIO recently gave $1,000,000 to the Eleanor Roosevelt Cancer
Foundation. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1961, p. 58, col. 1. The International Ladies
Garment Workers' Union and its affiliates have given $33,000,000 to charitable and
philanthropic causes since 1940 and $5,200,000 in the last three years. See N.Y.
Times, May 28, 1962, p. 25, col. 1.
-112See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1961, p. 76, col. 3.
113 The AFL-CIO has initiated a campaign to raise funds to aid the Algerian
labor movement. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1962, p. 1, col. 5.
114 See N.Y. Times, June 8, 1961, p. 19, col. 3.
115 See N.Y. Times, April 1, 1961, p. 1, col. 1.

116 Not all job-related activities warrant tax exemption. Union actions which
constitute part of a joint employer-employee scheme to gain market control can
logically be categorized as job related. These actions, however, are denied the immunity from the antitrust laws which labor generally enjoys. See Axr'ey GEN. NAT'L
Comm. ANTITRUST RE'. 293-306 (1955); Brickner, The Apex Decision: A New
Look at Unions Under Antitrust Actions, 11 LAB. L.J. 155 (1960); Daykin, Status
of Unions Under Our Antitrust Laws, 11 LAB. L.J. 216, 223 (1960).
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tained, the Regulations promulgated pursuant to section 501 (c) (5)
should be updated to acknowledge explicitly the legitimacy of many
union activities which have long been tacitly accepted.

III. A

REAPPRAISAL OF SECTION

501 (c) (5)

AND LABOR'S

ROLE IN MODERN SOCIETY

As we have tried to demonstrate, the labor organization exemption was written into the Internal Revenue Code and has been administratively and judicially applied without any comprehensive consideration of the interests at stake. In light of recent expansions in union
power, wealth, and activity, the implications of this substantial tax
advantage on labor's influence in modern society should be reexamined."n
Although several smaller unions are facing acute problems of dedining membership and increased unemployment by reason of expanded
automation, 1 8 the majority of labor unions today are vastly stronger
financially than they were fifty years ago when they first were granted
the tax exemption. 9 On June 14, 1962, then Labor Secretary Goldberg announced that assets of the nation's labor unions, based on 1960
financial reports submitted pursuant to the Landrum-Griffin Act, exceed
$1,300,000,000.12(
11 The problem of molding the modern labor union to the public interest has

intrigued many scholars. See, e.g., Form, Organized Labor's Place in the Community
Power Structure, 12 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 526 (1959); Goldberg, The Role of the
Labor Union in an Age of Bigness, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 54 (1960); Pendleton, Responsibility of Labor Unions in a Private Enterprise Economy, 10 LAB. L.J. 539
(1959).
1L8 See Raskin, The Unions and Their Wealth, The Atlantic, April 1962, p. 87.
Union membership in the United States has shown a constant decline in the past few
years. In 1960, there were 17,000,000 union members, 68,000 fewer than in 1959 and
341,000 fewer than in 1956. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1961, p. 46, col. 6. See also Fortune, April 1957, pp. 233-34. Union membership should continue to decline in the
future. See Lester, The Changing Nature of the Union, N.Y.U. 13TH ANNUAL CONFurthermore, rising costs plus steady unemployment
FERENCE ON LABOR 29 (1960).
have cut dues revenue and forced increased benefit payments. It is no wonder, then,
that close to one-half of the organizations submitting Landrum-Griffin reports operated
in the red during the recession year of 1959. Business Week, June 4, 1960, pp. 83-84.
119 One of the country's most affluent unions, the ILGWU, recently reported
liquid assets in its treasury of $76,600,000 which in 1961 earned $1,500,000. Adding
its solely administered and jointly administered employee benefit funds gives the
ILGWU $424,000,000. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1962, p. 25, col. 1. See Raskin, The
Unions and Their Wealth, The Atlantic, April 1962, p. 87. There is, however, a wide
divergence in size and strength, financial and otherwise, among various unions, industries, and even sections of the country. See Cox, The Uses and Abuses of Union
Power, 35 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 624, 628 (1960). In 1959, 25% of 260 national unions
had total receipts of more than $1,000,000 while 16% had receipts far less than $10,000.
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1962, p. 12, col. 1.
120 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1962, p. 12, col. 1. These figures are taken from
Landrum-Griffin reports for fiscal 1959 and are thus the first comprehensive economic
reports ever available on American unions, which traditionally have been reluctant
to disclose their financial affairs. These figures are exclusive of welfare and pension
funds; nor are income and assets of local and regional groups included in the statistics
for the affiliated nationals. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
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Labor's new affluence most crucially affects its relations with management. The fundamental assumption underlying American labor
policy has been that a labor agreement achieved by a process of unhindered negotiation between equals would be best for labor, management,
and the economy as a whole. Originally, the labor union tax exemption may have served to further the realization of countervailing power.
By affording unions a measure of financial assistance, however indirect,
the exemption enabled them to overcome their previously inferior position and, thus, to adopt a more useful role in society. But the time has
come to question whether the exemption has not fulfilled its task in this
regard. Continued financial aid of this nature may produce an imbalance of strength in favor of labor, inimical to the very ideal of col121
lective bargaining between equals which it once fostered.
Increasing union wealth may have yet another deleterious effect
on the collective bargaining process. To date, labor unions have made
Should they emno appreciable investment in corporate securities.'
ploy their tax-immune funds for such purchases in the future,m management's position may be further weakened. If a union owned a sigthe nation's wealthiest union, had assets of $111,311,000 and yearly receipts of about
$65,000,000. The United Mine Workers' assets exceeded $110,000,000, while the
receipts of the United Steelworkers and United Auto Workers in 1959 were $62,000,000
and $42,000,000 respectively. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1962, p. 12, col. 1.
121 The recent discussions of labor's power fail to frame the issues in terms of
the size of a union's economic resources. See, e.g., Symposium on Union Power and
the Public Interest, 35 NoTR DAME LAW. 590 (1960); Chamberlain, Labor Union
Power and the Public Interest, in THE PUBLIC STAKE IN UNION PowER (1959);
KuHN, LABOR INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMICS 127 (1959); LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND
CAPITALISM

(1949).

122This refers to treasuries and other funds directly controlled by unions; this
does not include pension, health, and other welfare funds, most of which are independently administered, and many of which have bought substantial amounts of
corporate securities.
12-3 There is a decided trend today toward liberalization of union investment
policies. For example, in 1953, one observer found that 42 internationals had put
73% of their money into bonds (mostly 2.75% governments), 5% into mortgages,
3.4% into real estate, and had retained 11% in cash. Only 1.6% of the reserves had
been invested in equities and that figure was inflated by one union which poured 70%
of its assets into the stock market, realizing a 6% return. Belfer, Trade Union Investment Policies, 6 IND. & LAB. REL. Rxv. 337, 339 (1953). As late as 1957, Fortune
magazine concluded that "union investment policies remain extremely conservative."
It did note that the Teamsters and the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers were now putting some money into FHA-backed mortgages. Fortune,
April 1957, p. 239. But recently, the evidence has mounted that unions are placing
more funds in such relatively lucrative sources as housing mortgages and corporate
equities. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1961, p. 1, col. 2. For instance, the Electrical
Workers Pension Fund has put half of its $61,000,000 backlog into real estate mortgages and one-third into corporate stocks and bonds. U.S. News and World Report,

Sept. 6, 1957, p. 114. In the past four years the ILGWU has invested one-third of
its total resources in Government-backed housing mortgages and an additional 11%
in corporate bonds. N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 10, cols. 1-2. That union also recently
announced its intention to invest $100,000,000 of its pension funds in government
insured farm loans. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1962, p. 12, col. 3. The AFL-CIO has
inaugurated a new Department of Investment at its Washington headquarters to
counsel its 132 affiliates on investment matters.
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nificant proportion of an employer's common stock,"2 that employer
as a collective bargainer, might be compelled to seek a settlement
favorable to its stockholder employees rather than one -which would
serve the best interests of its suppliers, customers, or other stockholders.""
A modest undercurrent of public opinion is developing to the
effect that some labor unions are overstepping the bounds of permissible behavior. 2 8 Much of this feeling may be traceable to the
economic ability of unions to strike for benefits which are not in the
public interest." 7 Most unions now maintain huge reserves for use
in the event of a strike.'2 These funds are at least partly generated by
the benevolence of our tax policy. To the extent that this benevolence
assists strikes which are contrary to the public interest, continued tax
Whether the danger point has alexemption may be undesirable.Y
ready been reached is unclear, but the possibility that union wealth will
continue to grow rapidly under the present tax structure necessitates
extremely sensitive scrutiny. Also, to the extent that the tax exemption. further unbalances the collective bargaining process, it augurs
more governmental intervention to protect the public interest, a development which would be viewed by many with disfavor.
The possibility that labor unions might use part of their increasing wealth to purchase corporate securities raises additional dangers
Our economy is
unrelated to the collective bargaining arena.'
theoretically based on the assumption that the profit motive, if allowed
124 The same reasoning would apply, to a
large amounts of stock in companies other than
125 To date, union leaders themselves have
both sides of the bargaining table. See Raskin,
Atlantic, April 1962, p. 87.
126 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong.,
Goldwater, quoted in N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1962,

lesser degree, if a union purchased
its employer.
been strongly opposed to sitting on
The Unions and Their Wealth, The
2d Sess. (1958); Remarks by Sen.
p. 15, col. 1; EELLS, THE MEANING

OF MODERN BusINESs 239 (1960); EELLs & WALTON, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
BusI NEss 120 (1961); KENNEDY, THE ENEMY WITHIN (1960); P=mo, THE LABOR
POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY (1957) ; PETRO, POWER UNLIMITED: THE CORRUPTION
OF UNION LEADERSHiP, at v-vi (1959) ; Chamberlain, The Problem of Strikes, N.Y.U.
13TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 421 (1960) ; Rees, Do Unions Cause Inflation?,

2 J.L. & EcoN. 84 (1959) ; Rothenberg, National Emergency Disputes, 12 LAB. L.J.
108 (1961) ; Note, Racial Discriminationin Union Membership, 13 U. MIAMI L. REv.
364 (1959).
127To cure these problems, many commentators have suggested changes in the
collective bargaining system to include such procedures as compulsory arbitration.
See Rothenberg, National Emergency Disputes, 12 LAB. L.J. 108, 137 (1961); N.Y.
Times, July 29, 1962, § IV, p. 9, col. 2.
128 See note 99 supra. The UAW presently possesses a strike fund of $40,434,109
and total resources of $60,298,499. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
12 It should be pointed out, hbowever, that in 1961, time lost through work
stoppages reached a postwar low of 0.14% of total working time. N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1962, § IV, p. 9, col. 1.
130 The financial dealings of unions today are not always antagonistic to those
of management. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers recently contributed money
to the American Institute of Men's and Boy's Wear, a trade association, for industrial
promotion. The Advance, March 15, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
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to operate freely, will maximize industrial benefits. But if management, in arriving at its decision, must heed the wishes of stockholder
employees, it might be forced to depart from the goal of profit maximization. Thus, such a management's equipment policy might sacrifice
efficiency to avoid unemployment incident to automation. Insofar as
the labor tax exemption leads to managerial disregard of the profit
motive, it represents yet another encroachment on the ideal of a free
enterprise system.
Unions owning corporate securities might further press for increased dividend payments at the expense of capital retention, since the
dividends, under the current tax code, are not taxable to the unions. A
decreased availability of internally generated funds, coupled with the
present high rates of borrowed capital, might reduce the rate of corporate expansion, a result at odds with current desires to accelerate
the growth of the Gross National Product. On the other hand, it is
equally possible that unions might favor capital retention at the expense of dividends, if increased capital investment would mean additional jobs for their members. In either event, dividend policy would
no longer be guided by normal business considerations.
In addition to compromising management's independence, union
ownership of an employer's securities might subject union leadership
to conflicts of interest. To the extent that a union has invested heavily
in an enterprise, its leaders might subordinate the short run aims of
its members to the protection of its investment, which may or may not
be in the long run interest of the employees. For example, a union
which has an equity interest in a company might well soften its wage
and other demands in an effort to stabilize or better the financial status
of the company.
Although unions have not significantly invested in corporate securities up to now, their investment in such relatively lucrative sources
as housing mortgages .. points up another weakness of section
501 (c) (5). The competitive advantage enjoyed by tax-exempt unions
The
may unfairly cripple taxpaying investors and money lenders.'
unrelated business income provisions, inspired by the fear of unfair
competitive advantage, might well be applied to investments too, now
that unions compete with regular financial institutions. There are, of
course, two obvious strategies which unions can undertake to dissuade
131 See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
132 The Amalgamated Clothing Workers owns and operates two banks with
combined assets, as of December 31, 1961, of more than $150,000,000. These banks
charge lower interest rates than competing commercial banks, and the union claims
that the existence of these lower rates prevents commercial banks from raising their
rates even higher. The Advance, March 15, 1962, pp. 8-9. If this is true, the taxexempt status of unions may provide unexpected benefits to the public.
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congressional adoption of more stringent provisions dealing with investment sources of income. First, they might seek investments which
do not bring them into direct competition with banking institutions and
insurance companies. Second, unions might enlist congressional support by investing in projects which involve some aspect of social
welfare. An example, illustrative of both strategies, would be union
investment in low income housing and FHA-insured mortgages in
urban renewal areas.lm In view of the reluctance of traditional lending institutions to extend credit to minority groups, unions could
invest profitably with FHA protection, fill a critical investment need,
and avoid competition with other investors.
Finally, increased union affluence may have a detrimental effect
on the structure of the labor movement itself. If wealthy unions
should purchase substantial quantities of corporate securities, they
would be in a position to increase job opportunities for their members
at the expense of members of unions less able to secure a voice in
corporate management. This could foster a more centralized labor
movement as the wealthier unions eliminate their weaker rivals. A
greater concentration of union power and wealth, in turn, would pro34
duce an even greater imbalance in the collective bargaining equation.
IV. SECTION 501 (c) (5) AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL CONTROL
With a continuation of labor's present tax status, union financial
strength may reach increasingly dangerous proportions. Whether
labor's present financial power-in part achieved by the benevolence of
the tax code-warrants intervention in the form of amendment or
possible elimination of the tax exemption is still unclear.'3 5 If and
when the danger point is reached, however, the advisability of revising
the present tax policy should be raised."3 "
133 If a union enters home financing on a large scale, as many have publicly said
they will, the Internal Revenue Service could claim that it had entered the home

financing business, an unrelated activity to which sections 511-13 of the Code would
apply. Although this might end the resulting unfair competition between unions and
regular financial institutions, such a step seems highly unlikely as a matter of administrative policy.
134 Some groups are already taking steps to correct what they feel is an unfair
balance in labor's favor. Several groups of investors have formed shareholder
"umions" to counteract the political and economic influence of labor organizations.
These groups, including United Shareholders of America, Stockholders and Share-

holders, Inc., Investors Union of America, and The Investors' League, have adopted

a program calling for an end to management's surrendering to inflationary wage

demands. See N.Y. Post, July 30, 1962, p. 32, col. 3.
'35 Labor's political importance makes congressional consideration of the advisability of eliminating or revising the exemption highly unlikely. Public opinion
and the general political climate must undergo substantial change before any likelihood of modification in labor's tax exemption can arise.
136 One authority, stressing that only employers and public opinion can control
inflationary problems relating to collective bargaining, has stated that tax law and

public policy can do little in this regard. Slichter, New Gods for Unions, in SELECTED
ESSAYS OF SUMNER A. SLIcHTER 291 (1960).
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Congress has, in some circumstances, balked at applying pressure
for social reform in this manner. It has refused, for example, to
utilize the taxing power to combat the problem of union corruption.
Legislation recommended by President. Eisenhower would have empowered the Secretary of Labor to investigate violations of the labor
laws pertaining to malpractice, corruption, and election rigging, to
hold administrative hearings, and issue final corrective orders subject
to judicial review. Included among the possible sanctions the Labor
Secretary could impose was loss of tax exemption. Secretary Mitchell,
in committee hearings in both Houses of Congress, supported the
provision as an effective deterrent to corruption "when all else in the
way of union members' self-help has failed." 137 The proposal, however, died in both comiiittees. The House committee took the position
that other remedies, such as injunctions, disclosure requirements, and
investigations, would more effectively combat abuses." s The Senate
report discussed the point in more detail: to give the Secretary of
Labor the power to take away a union's tax exemption, would be an
"unsound and unfair .

.

.

method of coercing obedience to legal

9

The Senate committee criticized the severity of such a
duties." '
penalty imposed on an all-or-nothing basis, bearing no relation to the
gravity of the offense. It also objected to the difficulty of the factual
determination that would have to be made. Lastly, it opposed the
unfairness of penalizing the general union membership for the offenses
of its officers. 4 ' In the legislation finally enacted, the Secretary was
empowered only to investigate charges of corruption, to make reports,
and to inform interested persons of his findings.' 4 '
Though denial of tax exemption was considered inappropriate as
a means of coping with the problem of union corruption, the Treasury
Department has taken preliminary steps to employ the tax machinery
to control union political activity. Though union members may deduct from their gross income dues,"4 initiation fees, and other con137 See Hearings on S. 505 Before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 279-303 (1959).
138 H.R. RiP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1959).
139 S. RFa. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959).

140 Ibid.
141 Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, § 601, 73 Stat. 539 (1959),

29 U.S.C.A. § 521 (Supp. 1961). The decision not to use loss of tax exemption as
a sanction to check corruption will likely be accepted by the Kennedy administration.
The Senate Report repeats almost verbatim testimony and formal statements of Professor Archibald Cox, now Solicitor General. Cox was at the time chief adviser to
then Senator Kennedy, prime exponent of labor reform legislation. Former Secretary
of Labor Goldberg, then special counsel to the AFL-CIO, attacked the proposal in his
appearance before the Senate Committee.
142 In practice, this is of little consequence as most taxpayers in lower brackets
elect the standard deduction. See IRS STATISTIcs OF INCOME 1 (1960). But the
principle of deductibility should be maintained. The cost of union membership is a
legitimate business expense of the working man.
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tributions used for ordinary labor activities,'3 a 1959 regulation denies
in part a deduction for contributions to groups which devote a substantial part of their efforts to influencing legislation.'" In view of
the considerable amount of political activity now sponsored by labor
organizations, 45 the regulation seems entirely proper; indeed it may
not go far enough. It is limited to those groups which devote a
"substantial part" of their activities to influencing legislation. However large lobbying expenses may be, they are only a small part of
total union budgets. To date there is no evidence as to whether the
Treasury will attempt to apply the regulation to such unions. If it
should decide to do so, administration of the restriction will be made
easier by the reporting requirement of the Landrum-Griffin Act. 48
Another precedent for altering the tax treatment of unions may
be found in section 504 of the Code. This section denies tax exemption to any public welfare organization which accumulates an unreasonable amount of income in any one year or which devotes substantial funds to purposes other than those for which the exemption is
granted. The purpose of the provision-"to force so-called charitable
organizations to spend currently the money which they receive for
purposes upon which their favored tax status is based" l4 -might well
be extended to unions.
143

I.T. 2888, XIV-1 CuM. BunL. 54 (1935)

(assessments for families of sick

or deceased members nondeductible; assessments for unemployment benefits deductible) ;
Rev. Rul. 190, 1954-1 Cum. Bum- 46 (assessments for pension fund required by
union constitution deductible).
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1959), as amended, T.D. 6435, 1960-1 Cum. Bunt_ 79.
14 5
In contrast to European trade unions which have traditionally been centers of
political controversy, American unions have only recently entered the arena of political
activity. See BARBASH, PRACTICE OF UNIoNIsm 246 (1954) ; Chamberlain, The COtporationand the Trade Union, in THE CORPORATION AND MODERN SocIrY 122 (1960).

Unions now act on three fronts: campaigning for prolabor candidates, lobbying for
specific legislation, and insisting on a voice in the formation of broad national policy.
Official reports filed with Congress showed that the labor movement spent almost
$2,500,000 in the 1960 presidential campaign, most of it to back President Kennedy
and other Democratic candidates. In the combined national, state, and local campaigns, the unions expended a sum estimated at more than $5,000,000. See Raskin,
The Unions and Their Wealth, The Atlantic, April 1962, p. 87. Mr. Raskin notes
that "with the decline of the big city party organizations, unions are now by all odds
the most dependable mechanism for swelling registration." Id. at 95. Unions also
provide crowds for political rallies. They have spent $500,000 for voter registration
drives. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1961, p. 19, col. 6. See also Sviridoff, Political Participation by Unions: The 1960 Situation, 11 LAB. L.J. 639 (1960). It should be noted
that § 304 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 18 U.S.C.
§ 610 (1958), forbids union contributions or expenditures "in connection with any
election" for federal office and this has been construed to mean that union funds cannot be used to influence the public at large. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S.
567 (1957) ; GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 541-43 (1949).
146Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, tit II, §201(a)-(c), 73
Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. §431 (Supp. 1961). See President's labor message
to Congress, Jan. 23, 1958 (relating to Taft-Hartley amendments, part I (b) (b) (3)),
N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1958, p. 8, col. 4.
14' 96 CONG. RBc. 14057 (remarks by Sen. Milliken).
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If Congress should decide to revise the present Code provisions
applicable to labor organizations, three possibilities should be explored.
Dues and assessments, currently the largest source of exempt funds,
could be taxed. This would drastically reduce union income. Inasmuch as these funds are somewhat analogous to untaxed contributions
to corporate capital, such an approach would perhaps be inequitable.
Investment income is the other major source of tax-exempt income.
If the major aim of Congress should be to limit the accretion of union
wealth and power generally, an across-the-board levy would be both
feasible and appropriate. If, on the other hand, Congress should be
concerned only with the effects of union investment in corporate securities, it could impose a tax on dividends received by labor organizations and continue the present exemption for rents and interest. Such
selective application of the taxing power would give Congress the
flexibility needed to deal with the specific problems it deems to be of
greatest significance.

